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ENERGY POLICY 
 
 
 
 
This article explores Russian energy pol-
icy in the Baltic Sea region in the context of 
the world energy market globalization. The 
study focuses on the three Baltic States — 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia — which have 
a similar geographical location and history. 
The dynamic development of the region as a 
whole is strongly influenced by the stability of 
energy supply in each state. The article 
analyses the role Russia plays in the energy 
policy of the region from both geopolitical 
and geostrategic viewpoints. The author iden-
tifies the main characteristics of the Russian 
energy policy in these countries, and provides 
with a forecast for energy policy development 
in the region. 
A geostrategic approach dictates any 
successful energy policy in the Baltic Sea re-
gion to bring in line Russian interests with 
those of the European states. 
 
Key words: energy policy of Russia, Bal-
tic Sea region, geostrategic approach to the 
study of energy 
 
We live in a world that is undergoing 
yet another major socio-political and 
economic transformation. Risks of vari-
ous kinds — nuclear, environmental, fi-
nancial, military, terrorist, biochemical, 
and informational — accumulate and are 
becoming the key decision-making fac-
tor. We are surrounded by those risks, 
and the risk, in turn, seeps inside. How-
ever, the mere presence of risks doesn’t 
spell ‘catastrophe’, but rather the antici-
pation of one [1, p. 47—48]. 
In order to foresee catastrophe in the 
‘world risk society’ (U. Beck), one must 
study the traditional research fields, secu-
rity, and world politics in combination 
with energy issues. The subjects of trea-
ties and diplomatic contacts established 
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on the Eurasian continent bring to the fore the issues of energy resource 
trade and energy transport projects thus giving an impetus to the joint con-
structive development of a non-confrontational type. 
This study focuses on the countries of the Baltic region — Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia, which share geographical location and have common 
history. The aim of this work is to research Russian energy policy in the 
countries of the Baltic region against the backdrop of world energy market 
globalization. To achieve this aim, we have put forward a set of objectives: 
 to describe contemporary world energy market; 
 to carry out a geopolitical and geostrategic analysis of Russia’s role in 
the energy policy of the Baltic region states (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia); 
 to identify the features of Russian energy policy in the countries of the 
Baltic region; 
 to examine the prospects of development of Russian energy policy in 
the region. 
The countries of the Baltic region are tied together by common history — 
rich in conflicts but driven by shared interests. The Hanseatic League of the 
14th—15th centuries serves as a good example. Despite the disputes between 
its member states, the trade between them was flourishing. During the Great 
Northern War (1700—1721) Sweden and Denmark — being at war with 
each other — still continued the joint use of the Nidingen lighthouse to en-
sure safe navigation in the Kattegatt strait. Shortly before WWI, Swedish 
companies Ericsson and Nobel Industries carried out a number of major 
commercial projects in Russia, although at the time Russia was a military 
threat to Sweden [2]. 
It is worth noting that Nobel Industries (the BraNobel company in Rus-
sia) contributed to the development of Baku oilfield and thus influenced the 
history of Russian oil industry. Among the Nobels’ contributions to the de-
velopment of oil industry in Russia is the construction of the first Russian oil 
pipeline. Another achievement is the creation of the oil tank fleet; the Nobels 
were also pioneers in the field of railway transportation of petroleum prod-
ucts. These are just a few examples of what can be achieved through col-
laborative constructive development of a non-confrontational type. There is 
much historic evidence that the Baltics Sea has often been a unifying rather 
than dividing factor for the region, which should serve as a good lesson for 
policy makers of the present day. 
Today, as before, the rapid development of the Baltic Sea states largely 
depends on how stable the energy components of each country are. This re-
lates to the globalisation of energy security, which rests on the principles of 
long-term, reliable, and green energy supply at adequate prices suitable for 
both exporting and importing countries. 
In the early 21st century the shape of the world energy market started to 
change. European countries are forming a common gas market. World ex-
porters compete fiercely for short-term and long-term contracts. The rapid 
development of Pacific Rim region (notably, China, Japan, India) accompa-
nied by an increase in its energy consumption requires new energy sources 
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and capacities. The increase in LNG trade has become an important global 
trend in the energy market. The leaders in the field are the USA and Canada. 
The new gas production and processing technologies allow the USA to prof-
itably produce shale gas. Shale gas production is a labour intensive and envi-
ronmentally hazardous process. However, the US still anticipates the so-
called ‘shale gas revolution’, and in 2011 alone it increased its shale gas ex-
traction to 214 billion m3. According to the International Energy Agency, 
global gas production will grow by 50 % until 2035; while non-traditional 
(first of all, shale) gas will account for two-thirds of this growth. The USA is 
the leader in shale gas production [3]. 
Russia is becoming increasingly integrated in the world energy market as 
it contributes to the operations of all command centres of world energy secu-
rity. The global nature of energy problems, their politicisation, and the in-
creasing role of Russia in the world energy arena made energy one of the 
crucial elements of Russian foreign policy. 
The topic of energy security is now a top priority in the framework of 
Russian energy dialogue with its major buyers — most importantly, the 
European Union and its individual member states such as Germany, the UK, 
France, the Netherlands, and Italy. The lack of an operational legal frame-
work is a major obstacle in the EU-Russia energy relations. 
In October 2012, a meeting of the Commission for Strategic Develop-
ment of the Fuel and Energy Sector and Environmental Security took place 
in Moscow, during which a draft of the Russian energy security doctrine was 
discussed. Among the priorities the draft puts forward are: secure supply of 
energy resources to customers; innovative development of fuel and energy 
industry; increased energy efficiency of all sectors of national economy; 
non-discriminating access of Russian exporters to external markets; and a 
stronger standing of the Russian Federation in the world energy markets. 
There is a need for swift and adequate reactions to changes in the energy 
market configuration. According to the speech delivered by Vladimir Putin 
at the meeting, ‘it is essential to consolidate the principles of intergovern-
mental cooperation in the energy sector with the EU countries and the EU as 
a whole, to develop a set of measures that will improve the competitiveness 
of the Russian electricity sector, and not only to keep our traditional markets, 
but also to expand to new markets in the near future’ [4]. 
The geostrategy of modern Russia should take into account the ‘new 
dimentions’ of energy unions, whose efficiency can eventually ensure 
Russian leadership in world energy politics. In the near future, the EU 
will not be able to forego Russian gas through replacing it with alterna-
tive energy sources. The structure of the EU’s gas import is as follows: 
Russia — 32 %, Norway — 34.6 %, Algeria — 14.5 %, other coun-
tries — 14.7 % [5]. 
Europe does have gas resources of the North Sea, but these are depleting. 
Experts estimate that after 2010 at least 60 % of European gas needs will be 
satisfied through import. As early as 2015, European demands for gas will 
increase by a third. Gas fields in the Netherlands and the UK are almost ex-
I. Zeleneva 
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hausted; Norway’s contribution to meeting the EU needs is on decline, and 
that of Russia is on the rise; the share of Algeria — a supplier of gas to 
Spain, Portugal and, to some extent, to Italy — will remain at the same level. 
At the moment, Russian gas accounts for 24 % of European energy needs. 
The EU countries encounter difficulties in developing a single concept relat-
ing to Russian gas supply, since the degree of their dependence varies 
greatly. For instance, the Baltics and southern states fully depend on Russian 
gas; the Nordic countries, Poland, and Germany are classified as “heavily 
dependent”, while Spain and England hardly depend on Russian gas at all. 
The latter insist on looking for “alternatives” to Russian gas. 
Russian energy policy relies on the assumption that Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, and partially Poland act predominantly as energy importers. The 
problems of the Baltic States’ energy dependence is deteriorated by that they 
spend approximately 13 % of GDP cost on energy import, which is ex-
plained by the low energy efficiency of industry in these countries. Russian 
monopoly on gas supply to the Baltic Sea states has existed since the Soviet 
times, yet back then the RSFSR was a friendly republic, whereas today, 
through the prism of politics, Russia is seen as an external threat to the en-
ergy security. Global political risks and changes in the sphere of interna-
tional security make the countries of the region look for the alternative ways 
to stabilise energy supply. The political aspects are accompanied by discon-
tent with high prices for Russian energy resources, which makes these states 
seek energy sources elsewhere. 
A liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal is expected to be put into operation 
in the Polish city of Świnoujście in 2014; with LNG delivered from Qatar. 
Starting from 2010 the Baltic States have been discussing the construction of 
LNG terminal for their region. However in 2011 Latvia proposed another pro-
ject, a Poland—Lithuania gas pipeline, which would grant the other countries 
access to German pipelines going through Poland. The unsolved economic 
problems within the region and the lack of a unified energy policy result in the 
EU’s lack of motivation to co-finance the project [6]. 
In the field of nuclear energy, Russian policy is based on the challenges 
faced by the country. In 2009 the EU closed down the Ignalina NPP in 
Lithuania for environmental reasons. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland 
reached a decision to construct the Visaginas NPP with Japanese technology 
(however, in 2011 Poland withdrew from the project). Poland and Estonia 
have now announced their intention to construct their own NPPs. In the 
meantime, Lithuania has signed a 10 year energy supply contract with Inter 
RAO UES, and the construction of the Baltic NPP in the Kaliningrad region 
and the joint NPP project with Russia and Belarus in the Grodno region can 
ensure electricity supply, perhaps, on more advantageous terms than the do-
mestic capacities of various industries of these countries [7; 8]. In this case, 
Russian project might receive support Poland, since an increase in natural 
gas transit through Belarus and Poland, for example, has already had a bene-
ficial effect on Russian-Polish relations [9]. 
In 2006, Gazprom made a transition to market-based pricing for the Bal-
tics, which made the prices double and then even triple. Simultaneously, 
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Gazprom acquired significant holdings of shares (around 30 %) of Baltic gas 
transportation companies. Gas pricing depends on the degree the country is 
integrated in Gazprom business, as well as the import capacity (as a result of 
its increase in 2011, Latvia and Estonia received a 15 % discount). In terms 
of relations with the EU countries the main challenge to Russian energy pol-
icy is the Third Energy Package adopted in 2009 [10; 11]. The philosophy 
behind this legislation rests on two principles. The first principle — owner-
ship unbundling — suggests that an agent cannot simultaneously produce 
energy resources and transport them to the EU countries. The second one — 
TPA (third-party-access) suggests that third parties can also use the transpor-
tation infrastructure — gas pipelines — alongside the supplier and the con-
sumer. Of course, these two principles pose a threat to the energy security of 
Russia and, first of all, Gazprom, which transmits gas to European countries; 
moreover, the emergence of new investors within a developed infrastructure 
can cause additional complications. 
The Baltic States hastened to meet the EU requirements for splitting 
gas supply and transportation, as well as to emphasise the need for fair 
pricing. 
According to the Energy strategy adopted in Russia in 2009, Gazprom 
and other energy companies with state backing aspire to maintain stable 
relations with traditional markets but use a geopolitical approach for ad-
vancing national interests, since economic security largely depends on 
successful energy export. Whether a transition from the geopolitical to a 
geostrategic (integrative) approach will be possible in this region is still 
an open question. The outcome will largely depend on whether the Baltic 
countries are able to abandon the position of “the last Western outpost” 
and assume that of “a bridge between the East and the West”. The signs 
of a geostrategic (integrative) approach are present in Russian energy 
policy regarding Poland. However, there are still complications in rela-
tions between Russia and the Baltics caused by the concerns about the 
declining role of transit countries in delivering Russian energy resources 
to Germany and other states of Western Europe. These complications are 
mostly connected with the development of oil transit via the ports of Pri-
morsk and Ust-Luga on the Russian territory and the continuation of the 
Russian Nord Stream project. 
In 2011 and early 2012, there was a certain increase in the volume of oil 
transhipped at Russian sea terminals. This happened for two reasons: first, 
there was a decrease in oil production at some fields; secondly, we saw the 
growth of oil processing within the country at national refineries. However, 
the export of crude oil through seaports is very likely to remain the principal 
area of Russian foreign trade, and modernisation and construction of sea oil 
terminals will continue. 
An increase in oil export to the Baltics is ensured through the 
growth in oil shipping via the port of Primorsk (BTS-1), as well as put-
ting the oil terminal in the port of Ust-Luga into operation. Experts be-
lieve that it will increase the surplus of Russian capacities ensuring ex-
port to the West. The check points on the Russian territory (Primporsk, 
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Novorossiysk, Ust-Luga, etc.), firstly, ensure the transit of Russian oil to 
Europe and, secondly, contribute to the energy security of the Russian 
Federation [12; 13]. 
Perhaps, the settling of disputes and the achievement of consensus by 
all countries of the region will require Russia to pay greater attention to 
energy cooperation in the framework of the Council of Baltic Sea States 
working under Russian presidency since July 2012. Successful energy pol-
icy in the region requires Russia to harmonize its interests (a geostrategic 
approach) with those of Western Europe — the consumers of Russian re-
sources. We can clearly see the need for that since yet another rift in rela-
tions between Russia and the Baltics stems from the adoption of the Euro-
pean energy legislation. At the same time, not all Western European ex-
perts believe that there is a need for an urgent liberalisation of energy mar-
kets because that can result in Russia pursuing a stricter gas supply policy. 
It is, after all, rather difficult to find an alternative to Russian gas, so any 
negative dynamics may adversely affect the Baltics [14; 15]. Russia should 
take into the account the integration of these countries into the European 
transmission networks in accordance with the plan of the European Com-
mission and the Baltic region states of 2009, because earlier the transmis-
sion systems of the Baltics were integrated only with those of Russia and 
Belarus. The optimal solution for the Russian Federation would be to 
launch the Baltic NPP as soon as possible and get involved with the Baltic 
Energy Ring project, which is aimed at bringing together all countries of 
the Baltic Sea region. 
Russian energy policy in the Baltic Sea region can be described through 
the following categories: involvement, integration, and innovation. In our 
opinion, these are not three different approaches, but rather three compo-
nents of Russian current geostrategy, including the energy dialogue between 
Russia and the EU. 
In the globalized world, with transnationalisation of international poli-
tics, the geopolitical paradigm should be replaced in several key aspects with 
a geostrategybased on the integrative principle of ‘selective involvement’ 
designed to qualitatively transform the entire sphere of social relations and 
transnational interaction. It should also generate strong transcontinental and 
internal regional streams and networks, interconnections and relevant forms 
of governance [16]. 
Perhaps, a new geostrategic method of research (geostrategy) will help 
Russia find a strategy for optimal and systematic integration into the world 
telecommunication and information space and develop a predictable and 
well-coordinated energy policy. 
At the moment the entire Eurasian continent is embracing a new hot 
topic — that of ‘energy bridges’, oil and natural gas transit routes. They are 
the subjects of modern geopolitical games. Today, information communica-
tions and energy bridges form a new global space, which serves as a site for 
emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. Integration processes 
create new ‘large spaces’ that clash the states together and create new hot-
spots of geopolitical tension. Energy interdependence will increase, as well 
 Energy policy 
 10
as consumption of energy; the struggle for control over energy resources and 
the national selfishness of states and regions in ensuring energy security will 
thus intensify. In the divided world there was a clash between two super-
powers (the USA and the USSR), whereas in the age of globalisation, there 
is competition not only between the developing superpowers, but also inside 
them. It would be more advantageous for Russia not to exploit contradic-
tions, but to encourage the neighbouring territories of the EU, Central Asia, 
and China towards integration. Against the background of major political 
and economic differences, energy security is a common ground for harmo-
nising the interests of these power-wielding agents. 
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This article analyses certain issues of 
implementation of Russian energy policy in 
the Baltic region from the geoeconomic per-
spective. The purpose of the study is to ex-
plain Russian energy policy in the region as 
dependent solely on the import capacity of its 
partners. Russian energy policy is viewed as 
one of the most important activities of the 
state and its business structures. As such it 
aims to achieve both general economic goals 
(generation of profit, market domination) and 
more specific geoeconomic tasks. At the same 
time, the policy follows the traditional rules 
of consumer/producer market game. Russian 
energy resources are delivered to an energy 
deficient region, where the demand and need 
for them is stable. The study is based on the 
author’s geoeconomic methodology, which 
extensively uses geographical and general 
scientific methods. This work aims to develop 
a geoeconomic paradigm in the framework of 
social geography. It will be of interest to 
anyone who aims to analyse the true motives 
behind Russian current energy policy. 
 
Key words: Russian energy policy, Baltic 
region, hydrocarbon resources, geoeconom-
ics, geoeconomics of energy sources 
 
The pipelines stretching across the 
territory of Russia help to connect unique 
mineral and raw material resources (in-
cluding hydrocarbon) and power generat-
ing capacities with their end users, i. e. 
industrial centres and other consumers in 
the pivotal geoeconomic centre, the 
European Union (EU). Because of the 
volume of its market (with population 
nearing 150 million people and a GDP of 
about 5 trillion USD) and its geographi-
cal proximity, the Baltic region has al-
ways been a point of special interest for 
Russia. The energy streams between Rus-
sia and the Baltic region are studied by 
applied geoeconomics. 
Geoeconomics, a research branch 
within the field of social geography, stud-
ies the formation of structural elements of 
global geoeconomic space [1; 2]. Such 
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